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Abstract 
Industrial Foundations are foundations which own business companies (Thomsen, 2012), 
and these are very common in the Northern Europe. Foundations are perceived as long-term 
shareholders, thus, this model arises as a sustainable and rational solution to avoid short-
termism. This thesis contributes to the existing literature by exploring the application of this 
type of ownership in the Southern Europe, namely in Portugal and Spain. In Portugal, there are 
some examples of charitable industrial foundations with small dimension, whereas in Spain the 
model and its benefits have been, recently, recognized and adopted by large corporates, 
nonetheless, still exist in a small amount. 
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1.Introduction 
Bansal and DesJardine (2014) said that “sustainability is fast becoming fashionable in 
strategic management, yet its meaning can be elusive” as it is often confined to environmental 
issues or referring to corporate social responsibility measures.  However, it should not be seen 
as acts of kindness, but as a creation of long-term business value (Bansal and DesJardine, 
2014). In the business world, this concept is crucial to avoid short-termism. The concept of 
short-termism is defined by “decisions and outcomes that pursue a course of action that is best 
for the short term but suboptimal over the long run” (Laverty, 1996). So, firms must make 
trade-offs across time to safeguard intergenerational equity (Bansal and DesJardine, 2014). 
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Hence, as concerning short‐termism seems to be for corporate governance, many scholars 
were inspired to search for institutional arrangements to promote long‐term decision‐making 
(Thomsen et al, 2018). In this thesis, I call attention to long‐term ownership by industrial 
foundations, which are common in the Northern Europe, but little known and studied in the 
rest of the world.    
The term “industrial foundation” is described by Steen Thomsen 2 (2017) as foundations 
that own business companies and whose long‐term owners allow for practice of long‐term 
governance. Despite the fact that this concept appears to be quite exotic, in part due to 
ignorance and also due to hostile regulation (Thomsen, 2017), it is possible to name a number 
of highly successful and worldwide-known corporations under foundation ownership, for 
instance: Bertelsmann, Heineken, Ikea, Robert Bosch, Rolex, A.P. Møller-Maersk, Novo 
Nordisk, the Tata Group and Carlsberg. In fact, most of these are located in the Northern 
Europe, where foundation-owned companies account for a non-trivial share of the business 
sector (Thomsen, 2012). For example, experts estimate the value of listed companies controlled 
by Danish foundations at about 68% of the total market capitalisation quoted on Copenhagen 
Stock Exchange (Mcculloch, 2018). 
Overall, the foundations that own the companies are non-profit entities, they have no owners 
and are under the control of a self-elective board of directors (Thomsen and Rose, 2004), whose 
compensation is completely divorced from the profitability of the company and who cannot be 
removed or replaced by anyone except themselves (Hansmann and Thomsen 2018). The most 
important purpose is, typically, to exercise responsible ownership of a business company. 
Secondly, industrial foundations, often, perform philanthropic activities funded by dividends 
from the company and portfolio investments (charitable industrial foundations). But there are 
                                                             
2 Steen Thomsen is Professor at the Center for Corporate Governance at Copenhagen Business School and 
principal investigator on the topic. The author of the current thesis acknowledges his contribution on the 
research with his useful insights and the offer of his book “The Danish Industrial Foundations” (2017).  
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also examples of foundations, which aim to benefit the founding family through donations 
(family foundations) or whose only purpose is to own a business company and, therefore, do 
not donate at all (business foundations) (Thomsen, 2017). However, the majority of industrial 
foundations combine both business ownership and philanthropy, which means that part of the 
company's profits distributed to shareholders are devoted to philanthropic means rather than 
paid out to the investors (Thomsen, 2018).  
The triggering enigma of industrial foundations emerges, then, when bearing an immense 
body of literature supporting that dispersed ownership and economic incentives play a key role 
in the efficient operation of business companies (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Putterman, 
1993; Hart, 1995; Hansmann, 1996; Williamson, 1996; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), we realize  
that several are the companies owned in its majority by foundations, whose directors do not 
benefit from substantial material incentives, other than losing their jobs in case the foundation 
bankrupts and needs to be liquidated (Thomsen, 2018), and which still allow for the companies 
to be top-performers and live longer. Such evidence makes one question if this particular type 
of non-profit organization, the industrial foundation, can be, as a matter of fact, a viable and 
competitive business structure and, to a greater extent, a more sustainable one. One may also 
place the question in a different way, that is, whether profit-seeking ownership is a necessary 
condition for competitive enterprise (Thomsen and Rose, 2004).  
It is precisely this relationship between foundation-ownership and governance with long-
term perspective that this project focusses the scope of research on, however, it does so over a 
specific location: Southern Europe, namely in Portugal and Spain, where, according to the main 
expert on the topic, Steen Thomsen, literature is still in its research phase, few examples are 
known and there is interest for investigation in this region to take place. Hence, this thesis aims 
to close the addressed gap by 1) mapping out organisations under the defined type of ownership 
existing in the Southern Europe reality, 2) understand the set of key characteristics that defined 
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them and, by intersecting with existent literature, 3) do a comparative analysis with the 
corresponding characteristics of the Nordic Industrial Foundations. With the resulting findings, 
the underlying study wishes at responding to the following guiding research questions:       
Research question 1: How do we understand industrial foundations in the context of 
Portugal and Spain? 
Research question 2: In which ways is the understanding of Industrial Foundations similar 
across different European countries? 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows: after the introduction, section 2 reviews 
current literature to gain a comprehensive understanding of the industrial foundations concept 
and factors that influence its emergence; section 3 regards the methodology used, including the 
motivations for the method and the data collection and analysis processes, section 4 exposes 
the two levels of findings, which are then discussed and confronted with literature in section 5 
along with limitations of the study and potential areas for further research and, finally, the 
section 6 provides overall conclusions encompassing all outcomes. Sources used are 
scrutinized in section 7 and appendix in section 8. 
2. Literature Review 
On a first hand, the concept of industrial foundations can be named differently across 
different geographies, which, however, transmit different meanings.  For instance, while the 
term corporate foundation denotes a foundation established by a company for CSR purposes, 
a commercial foundation indicates a more commercial purpose, which is not usually the case 
of the foundations we meant to describe in this thesis. Broader, the term enterprise foundations, 
widely used in Germany, for instance, (Hopt and von Hipppel, 2010) covers all foundations 
with any business activity, even if it is rather small, such as a museum, which sells tickets and 
runs a cafeteria and a museum shop. Nonetheless, and not intending to neglect the important 
role these organizations play in society and their philanthropic purposes, this thesis aims to 
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solely focus on the study of real, competitive business companies with significant economic 
activity, which are owned in its majority by foundations and that do not depend on government 
funding for their existence (Thomsen, 2017). Therefore, for the sake of consistency, and 
bearing the actual definition we are aiming to convey, the term industrial foundations is 
primarily used to invoke organizations that reflect all following legal characteristics (Kronke, 
1988): 
1. Creation by donation: The industrial foundation is created through an irreversible3 
donation of its ownership stake in the company, by the company’s founder at the end of his 
active life.  Transfer of ownership to the foundation, according to Thomsen and Rose (2004), 
may serve as an alternative to passing ownership to heirs or to outside investors, and is uniquely 
suited for business owners who want to preserve core values and business principles, which 
are easily diluted by profit incentives (Thomsen, 2018). The foundation establishment may also 
be motivated by inheritance and wealth taxes saving while maintaining control of the business, 
as well as, wish to keep a stable ownership of the company or, simply, due to a philanthropic 
desire to “give back to society”. 
2.  Independence: Prewitt (2006) said that independence unites foundations apart from their 
variety in terms of their legal and organizational forms, as well as, their differences in how they 
operate, essentially, they have no owners nor members, thus, can be referred to as “self-owning 
institutions”. Industrial foundations are also private (i.e. non-governmental), non-profit entities 
which economic affairs are completely separated from those of the founder and founder’s 
family (Thomsen, 2017). 
3. A non-selfish purpose: While the company is responsible for the business part, the 
foundation itself must serve a non-selfish purpose that goes beyond benefiting the employees 
or concerning for the future generations of the founder’s family. For instance, it may contribute 
                                                             
3 Irreversibility separates industrial foundations from US-style family trusts (Thomsen, 2017). 
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to charity, education, research, art or social projects, and as such, industrial foundations are 
socially responsible by design.  
4. Foundation Endowment: The foundation must own shares/voting rights in a company that 
represents access to a source of future income and, in most cases, a pool of liquid financial 
assets. 
5. Foundation Organization: Since foundations have no ownership, their boards of directors 
(or trustees) play a very important role. Usually, they are self-elective (Thomsen and Rose, 
2004) and, possibly, part of this board is constituted by managing directors and employees 
from the company. 
6. Foundation Charter: Tantamount to other foundations, industrial foundations are ruled by 
a charter in which the founders enshrine the core values and business principles they want to 
preserve (Thomsen, 2018). Additionally, it often stipulates that the foundation should serve 
some broadly defined social purpose, includes specific rules on the election and composition 
of the foundation’s board, as well as, guidelines about governance and ownership of the 
company.  Such constraints are always subject to government approval and supervision, and 
the board must act at its own discretion (Thomsen and Rose, 2004). 
7. Outside supervision: Industrial foundations cannot be monitored by owners or members, 
and hence, must be regulated and supervised by a government authority, like a foundation 
regulator, charity commissions, courts or the local tax authorities (Thomsen, 2017), to ensure 
that foundations comply with the law and with their foundation charter (Kronke, 1988). They 
are also responsible to control audited annual reports submitted by the foundations. Thus, the 
regulator usually does not intervene in business decisions, but can, for instance, replace the 
board in case of neglect or abuse through donation policies or board member overcompensation 
(Thomsen, 2017).  
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8. Majority control / voting majority of a business company: Having a controlling ownership 
stake in a private business company, with significant sales of goods and services to the public 
on a commercial basis (i.e. in a competitive market), is what separates “industrial” from purely 
charitable foundations. Ownership could be full (100%), and foundation board members may 
be identical and even (in a few cases) use the foundation structure to conduct business without 
incorporating a separate company, or just a controlling influence, i.e. more than 50%, and so, 
the company will, in principle, act like any other joint stock company and it will have fiduciary 
duty to all its shareholders (Thomsen, 2012). 
Overall, the above described set of key characteristics defines most of the Nordic Industrial 
Foundations. Nonetheless, literature review also allowed to grasp the determinants for the 
existence of industrial foundations and how this unique governance structure influences the 
behaviour and performance of companies.      
First off, by observing the clustered location of most industrial foundations, mainly in the 
Northern European countries, presumably indicates significant influence of country effects, 
namely, their legal recognition, which clearly determines their establishment 4. Additionally, 
governments can also make it more attractive for industrial foundations to set in by imposing 
lighter taxation in comparison to other alternative ownership arrangements. It may be no 
accident that in Northern Europe wealth tax rates are high (Thomsen, 1999), which reduces the 
effectiveness of monetary rewards and encourages business owners to seek non-standard 
ownership structures (Thomsen, 2018). Yet, Nordic countries offer more than just wealth 
preservation benefits, culturally, these are small and homogenous countries with strong social 
norms. For instance, they score high on indices of governance, trust, and corruption control 
                                                             
4 For instance, in 1969, the US reformed its tax laws to effectively prevent private foundations from having 
control of businesses (Fleishman, 2001, Thomsen, 2006). It sought to remedy perceived abuses that private 
foundations’ charitable organizations served the interests of the rich rather their charities (Mcculloch, 2018). 
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(Thomsen, 2016a, 2016b), and that plays a role in keeping directors honest and maintaining a 
responsible business behaviour.  
Investigators have also studied the possibility for specific industries to be more prone to this 
kind of ownership (Kuhn and Thomsen, 2015a). The empirical evidence demonstrates, 
however, examples of industrial foundations spread across all the industry spectrum, and, ergo, 
it cannot be taken as a fundamental factor.  
On the other hand, the same cannot be said regarding firm effects, as the advantages of long-
termism, characteristic of industrial foundations, only take place with companies that are rather 
successful and well-consolidated (Børsting et al. ,2014a), i.e. large and mature companies that 
have been in existence for at least two or more decades (Thomsen, 2017). Such firms are less 
likely to be capital-constrained and can autonomously finance their investments without 
infusions of outside equity.  Indeed, it would seem to make little sense that founders would 
donate a start-up, which highly depends on profit incentives, or a failing company that is urging 
for outside capital, to a foundation.  
Ultimately, previous research studied possible founder effects that can influence the origin 
of industrial foundations. The founder, when taking the choice of ownership succession for her 
company, usually, has in mind, along with other factors, the economic incentives respective to 
each option, which are specifically: selling the company to an industry buyer, taking it public, 
leaving the company bequeathed to descendants or setting up an industrial foundation. The 
findings (Thomsen, 2017) indicate that founders with no descendants willing and able to take 
over the company, have greater chances to settle industrial foundations. 
Therefore, these determinants, unique to industrial foundations, unquestionably, play a role 
in how these organizations emerge and behave. Legally, they are perpetuities with an obligation 
to preserve their endowment (i.e. the company), and in fact, they may be regarded (Schelling, 
1960, 2005) as commitment devices, since, the survival of the company, irrevocably, becomes 
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the primary objective. Consequently, this presupposes a more patient governance style with 
longer time horizons compared to family or investor ownership. In practice, these companies 
engage more in long-run investments, like R&D and education, and are less likely to fire loss-
making managers, which, in turn, can mean higher labour costs. On the other hand, they are 
also intrinsically more risk averse and have constrained access to outside capital, so, 
foundation-owned companies do not compromise their future by getting into high leverage or 
risky investments and neither are willing to dilute their control/ownership. Ultimately, this 
translates into fewer mergers and acquisitions and slower growth (Thomsen, 2017).  
In addition, managers of foundation-owned companies tend to commit to a more ethical 
behaviour, with greater preoccupation for their reputation. Moreover, the absence of monetary 
incentives entails less breach of contracts with the stakeholders and greater commitment to the 
charter’s values and principles (Mayer, 2013, Thomsen, 2017).  
Altogether, theoretical and empirical research does not provide, however, a clear prediction 
on how foundation-owned companies financially perform. On one hand, their lack of personal 
profit motive to monitor managers and their inability to attract capital from outside investors 
are strong weaknesses that, theoretically, anticipate a performance - in terms of profitability, 
growth and cost efficiency -  to be below average (Casper and Rose, 2004). Sceptics would 
claim that these weaknesses cast doubt on the financial viability of foundation ownership 
(Thomsen, 2018). On the other hand, previous studies (Thomsen, 1996, 1999, Hermann and 
Franke, 2002, Rose and Thomsen, 2004) found the economic performance of foundation owned 
companies to be no worse or even slightly better than that of companies with more common 
ownership structures. Thus, the balance of the weaknesses and strengths will depend on several 
determinants that characterize the context in which each firm is. The literature (Kuhn and 
Thomsen, 2015) concludes that advantages associated with long-termism will be enhanced by 




3.1 Motivations of research design:  
Bearing the guiding research questions of the present study, the choice was to employ a 
qualitative research approach, which focuses on obtaining data through open-ended and 
conversational communication. Such methodological approach is very convenient in the 
corporate governance context (Yasin and Sulaiman, 2014), as it provides a great opportunity 
to gather precise and relevant data about motivations and beliefs of the people behind the 
analysed organizations. 
3.2 Sample Selection:  
Within the aforementioned geographical context, followed an investigation for 
organizations that fit the majority of characteristics that describe most of northern industrial 
foundations studied by Steen Thomsen (2017). In order to facilitate this search, a set of 4 
variables (T1-T4) (see Appendix: Table 1) was selected to use as a filter for finding the most 
interesting and significant cases. The objective was to adopt in this investigation a theoretical 
“Thomsen lens” and use it as a reference for the type of organizations we were looking for in 
Portugal and Spain.  
The initial pre-samples of foundations explored were provided by privileged observers who 
are experts in the community of foundations both in Portugal, namely, Mário Curveira Santos, 
General Secretary from Centro de Fundações Portuguesas, and in Spain, Rosa Gallego García, 
International Relations Director from the Asociación Española de Fundaciones, to whom the 
author expresses sincere gratitude for their collaboration. The final samples drawn5 
                                                             
5 The foundations, and respective companies, selected verify at least three of the four variables T1-T4. The level 
to which they were kept or not in the sample encompasses an evaluation case by case and contextualization of 
the variables for both countries. 
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contemplate 5 foundations in Portugal (labelled F1-F5) and 5 foundations in Spain (F6-F10), 
which details are described in the Tables 2 and 3 (in the Appendix)6.  
3.3 Data Collection and Analysis processes: 
 To better understand the context in which the selected cases emerged in, the next section 
starts with a brief review of the foundational environment in Portugal and Spain (Table 2). 
Thereafter, a concise analysis variable by variable was performed (Table 3), based only on 
secondary sources, similar to the analysis pursued in Chapter 5 of Steen Thomsen’s book 
(2017). The goal was to find common patterns of attributes and do a cross-country comparative 
analysis. When doing so, there were intriguing aspects found in the samples studied, which 
motivated a more comprehensive investigation, through collection of primary data from 
experts. Thus, to enrich the framework of the study and gain new insights for the literature, two 
individual semi-structured interviews 7were conducted: 1) with an expert from F5 in Portugal, 
and 2) with an expert from F7 in Spain.  
4. Findings 
The current study encompasses two levels of findings: 1) first, based on secondary sources, a 
review on foundational context in each country (Table 4) and a characterization of the industrial 
foundations analysed (using Tables 2, 3 and 5); and 2) on a second level, primary data was 
used to provide robustness to the first analysis, to clarify intriguing aspects, and preview future 




                                                             
6 All information about the companies and foundations was retrieved from secondary online sources, namely 
company websites, annual financial and non-financial reports, previous interviews, news and opinion articles. 
7 The semi-structured interview framework provided a certain flexibility, preventing a narrow exchange of 
thoughts and allowing follow-up and probing questions (Gillham 2005). The interviews lasted about 45 minutes, 
were conducted via videoconference and phone call, recorded and transcribed in verbatim form. 
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4.1 Foundational Context: Portugal and Spain  
 Table 4 Summary review of the foundational context in Portugal and Spain 
Portugal's Foundational Environment   Spain's Foundational Environment 
Definition of foundation: 
A foundation is a non-profit organization created on the initiative of one 
or more individuals or legal entities (founders) for the management of a 
property irrevocably donated to them by the founders and which must be 
substantially preserved, for the fulfilment of certain purposes of social 
interest.  
 
A foundation is a non-profit organization that pursues purposes 
of general interest and benefits generic groups of people. Its initial 
assets, the heritage, must be an unrecoverable contribution from the 
founder(s), with a minimum €30 000 of worth, and along with future 
assets will permanently be affected by those social purposes. 
Furthermore, the revenues generated by the foundation cannot 
directly or indirectly benefit the founder or the employers, who are 
those who govern it, or to singular persons who do not pursue 
purposes of general interest. 
Source: Portuguese Center of Foundations (2019)   Source: Spanish Association of Foundations (2019) 
Regulatory Authority: 
General Secretariat of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers 
(Secretaria-Geral da Presidência do Conselho de Ministros)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
 Protectorates                                                                                                                                                         
 Distinction factor:                                                                                           
In Spain, foundations are not subject to a single basic Law, but instead, have 
to follow specific rules imposed by the Protectorate of the Spanish 
Autonomous Community they are inserted in, as some have their own laws 
on the subject. Currently, about 71% are attached to these autonomous 
protectorates. 
   Source: INAEF et al. (2011) 
Main responsibilities:          
 -     Recognition, modification of the bylaws                                                                     
-     Extinction of foundations                                                                                            
-     Recognition of its public utility status, which has as its primary objective the 
attainment of tax benefits.                                                                                                  
-     Definition of legal obligations based on the pillars of transparency (e.g. Code of 
Good Practices, compliance with the objectives and management rules, constant 
reporting, control on money laundering, etc).   
 -    Annual accountability                                                                                  
-     Budget supervision and action plan and                                                      
-     Processing of authorizations and communications for certain acts of 
property disposition. 
Number of foundations: 
Census 2011:  817 foundations  Census 2011:  12 921 foundations 
Source: ECO.Sapo (2019) 
 
Of these, 9 050 are estimated to be active, that is, 70% of the total. 
Updated counting (2019):   884 foundations 
 
Source: INAEF et al. (2011) 
Largest 
Foundation:                                              
Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation (F2)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Total assets: €2 616 Million                             
(Portuguese foundations' total assets: €9 000 M)   
Largest 
Foundation:                                              
"la Caixa" Foundation (F7)                    
Total assets: €22 700 Million 
Source: Forbes (2019)       
Observations: 
  - In 2012, Portuguese legislation for foundations suffered a profound reform 
which led to the extinction of numerous foundations, the reduction of benefits 
and public support grants and even the cancelation of public utility status 
granted. During the reform, it was also created a much more detailed 
foundations' legal regime through the Foundations Framework Law (Lei-
Quadro das Fundações) and entitled a government authority to control them.                                                                                                
  -  Overall, there is a stable legal regime relating to Portuguese Foundations.  
 
 -  Spain is, after Germany, the country with the highest number of 
foundations, however, these do not enjoy great tax incentives to 
perform more philanthropic activities and be more active, reason 
why many demand for change in the Patronage Law. 
Source: Funds People (2018)  Source:Vozpópuli (2018) 
4.2 Portugal: sample analysis and characterization:  
By observing the industrial foundations selected in Portugal it can be seen that there is an 
apparent pattern of very high ownership stakes (≥50%) held by the foundations in Portugal 
(T1). However, two cases require further attention: 
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F1-C18: In recent November 2019, the foundation sold the totality of the company, which 
core business was no longer in line with the objectives of the foundation. The foundation 
guaranteed, nonetheless, that the future holder would be reliable, respectful of the company’s 
unique history, its high-quality portfolio, and the strength of its management and employees 
(Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 2019).  
F5-C5: This case is the exception in the Portuguese sample, as the foundation only holds a 
minority share of 4.15% (José de Mello Saúde, 2019). 
Moreover, all foundations, except one (F4), were created through an irreversible donation by 
the company’s founder or relatives (T3) with the main objective of perpetuating founders’ 
companies and social projects. Distinctive cases: 
F4-C4 - The foundation started as a public foundation and with a partnership with a foreign 
government, which granted the foundation the proceeds from gambling business in that 
foreign country. (Fundação Oriente, 2019) Later on, that link was broken, and the Foundation 
became private and fully autonomous, in the country of its origin (Portugal), creating then a 
small bank (C4) which aimed at assisting the Social Economy segment with financial and 
banking services. It is, therefore, not a donation, but a majority holding of the foundation, 
which is, however, at risk of being sold bearing the ongoing bad performance of the bank 
over the years (Alves, 2019).  
F2-C2 - The development of the agricultural and industrial exploitation, that led to the 
emergence of wine and olive oil business and brand, only took place after the death of the 
founder. In fact, they were developed in the estate assets donated by him, with the primary 
goal of guaranteeing the self-sustainability of the institution and the pursuit of its mission, as 
                                                             
8  The consideration of this case for the sample had in mind the fact that it is a great example in Portugal of 
creation of an industrial foundation through donation of assets by its founder. Moreover, it is relevant as it is by 
far the largest foundation in the country and is within the 40 largest foundations in the world (ECO, 2019). 
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a consequence, it also contributed to the promotion of the economic and social development 
of the region. (FEA, 2019) 
Finally, one last point about the Portuguese foundations: they all have a clear public utility, 
as they develop actions with philanthropic purposes (T4), namely, contribute to the promotion 
of the arts, culture, education and science, in a broad sense, but some, for instance, give greater 
preference to deploy such promotional activities in specific regions (F2, F3 and F4). 
The companies held by the foundations (T2), on the other hand, reveal dispersion across 
different sectors of activity, deliver both products and services and also embrace different size 
categories, being mostly small-medium enterprises, according to European Commission (2003) 
standards. 
Overall, we can say that we have found in Portugal examples of family industrial foundations, 
which are used as an instrument to honour, reinforce and continue the social work of its founder 
(F1, F2, F3 and F5), and which developed (C2 and C4) or continue on exploring (C1, C3 and 
C5) economic activity under normal conditions of the competitive market, to guarantee the 
subsistence of the philanthropic activities of the foundations. Nonetheless, companies’ 
industrial size is considerably small, and foundation-ownership is at risk in some cases given 
misalignment from foundation’s core values (F1) or company’s financial instability (F4). 
4.2.1 Analysis on the interview with an expert from F5-C5 
There was an opportunity to interview an expert from Fundação Amélia de Mello (F5), 
where we 1) clarified some questions about this foundation ownership example and 2) explored 
the experts’ opinion on the application of the concept of industrial foundations in Portugal (see 
Table 6, in the Appendix, for complete transcript of the interview). 
First off, the expert did not recognize the concept and term industrial foundations, and 
instead, distinguished two categories of foundations: a) the corporate foundations or business 
foundations, which he relates with foundations that are associated with a brand (i.e. those which 
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have the brand’s name as the name of the foundation) and that may have a marketing motive, 
besides the philanthropic purpose implicit in them all - within this category, he identified a sub-
type of foundations, the territorial foundations, which have special criteria for the territory 
where they intervene, one example is the Gulbenkian Foundation; b) There is also the category 
of family foundations, in which the expert included the Amélia de Mello Foundation (F5), and 
that he identified as those who are not associated with a brand directly and have a family 
project. In the end, he does not consider F5 as an Industrial Foundation, neither it has any 
impact in the CUF Group’s (C5) management, this is because the share they hold, and which 
aim to maintain for the moment, is very small (4.15%). It is just another asset part of the large 
and diversified portfolio that the foundation has. 
Moreover, besides identifying several examples of foundations owning businesses in 
Portugal, the expert does not believe that this concept applies significantly in the country, 
because, back in 1975, after the Carnation Revolution, there was an impactful process of 
nationalization of very big companies in Portugal by the newly created state, that destroyed the 
corporate entrepreneurial structure and that never recovered completely up until today. 
Therefore, without the “old money” of these capitalists and without a consolidated “private 
economy”, the expert said that it is difficult for large industrial foundations to set in. There is 
no space for philanthropy to develop through foundations and proceed to the redistribution of 
the accumulated capital to the society. Nonetheless, the expert believes that if there is economic 
development and businesses growth, there will be more capacity and conditions for industrial 
foundations to emerge, perhaps through the “new money” that was created after the 
nationalization of companies’ phase.    
4.3 Spain: sample analysis and characterization: 
Within the Spanish sample, contrary to the Portuguese trend, we observe lower controlling 
ownership stakes (T1), never achieving the totality, and three of the cases (F7, F8 and F9) are, 
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in fact, below 50%. Nonetheless, in all cases, except F9-C9, foundations are the largest 
shareholder. On the exception mentioned, foundation ownership is recent (2017). According 
to the Grupo Siro Foundation (F9), the Cereal to Siro Foods (C9) started as a “family business 
and dreams of its legacy lasting more than 500 years. That’s why its owners have decided to 
hand down their company to the Grupo Siro Foundation” which “will therefore become the 
next owner of the company and already holds a 5% stake in the group”. In the words of the 
founder González Serna (2017), the goal is that the “business model has to endure, go beyond 
us, transcend”. 
Additionally, establishment of the foundation through an irreversible donation of assets by 
the founders with the aim of securing more independence and long-term future of their business 
projects (T3) is visible in two of the five cases (F8 and F9). Exceptions: 
F6-C6: The foundation was primarily created to channel the socially responsible performance 
of the parent institution. Later, majority of control of the group was transferred to the 
foundation to ensure a greater independency and business sustainability (elEconomista, 2006). 
F7-C7: The banking foundation resulted from a transformation of a savings bank in order to 
comply with Savings Banks and Banking Foundations Law of 2013. The foundation became 
the largest shareholder of the bank (C7), with the holding limit imposed (40%) through an 
unlisted investment holding company that manages the remaining F7’s portfolio of assets (Obra 
Social la Caixa, 2019). 
F10-C10: The foundation was established to complement the activity of its founding 
organization (ONCE, which provides social services to blind people) by extending the 
employment, training, accessibility and other initiatives to the rest of people with disabilities 
(ONCE Foundation, 2019). The business itself (C10) emerged a few years later with the aim 
of diversifying the income sources of the founding entities and generating employment 
opportunities for people with disabilities (Ilunion, 2017). 
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Moreover, in accordance with what was found in the sample of Portugal, they all pursue non-
selfish purposes (T4), which range from promoting and supporting health, education, scientific 
and social research to contributing to social inclusion for disabled people and recovery and 
preservation of historical heritage, mainly inside the Spain’s national regions and Spanish 
speaking communities (F7). On the other side, the business companies in question do also 
commercialize across a variety of sectors with both products and services, but in contrast with 
Portugal, all companies are large, more consolidated and employ, on average, more people.   
Generally speaking, it seems that the foundation ownership is more recent in Spain (on 
average since 1998) compared to Portugal ( on average since 1971), encompassing larger and 
more consolidated firms, including a banking foundation established by law (F7), a social 
institution that originated a foundation to broaden the target of its social purpose (F10), and 
three cases where part of the ownership was donated to a foundation with the clear purpose of 
perpetuating the company’s activity (F6, F8 and F9). 
4.3.1 Analysis on the interview with an expert from F7-C7 
Within the Spanish sample, it was possible to interview an expert from “la Caixa” 
Foundation (F7), where we had the opportunity to 1) review the historical evolution of the bank 
and creation of the foundation, 2) discuss intriguing aspects 3) understand the behaviour of the 
foundation as an investor, 4) explore future prospects regarding foundation-ownership, 5) quest 
expert’s opinion on the other foundation-owned companies included in the sample, and finally, 
6) what he resonates about this type of ownership structure, particularly, in Spain and 
Portugal  (see Table 7, in the Appendix, for complete transcript of the interview). 
In that line of thought, it is paramount to remember that La Caixa Foundation (F7) is a 
particular case of industrial foundation, as it is a banking foundation established to comply with 
Savings Banks and Banking Foundations Law of 2013 imposed in Spain, when “the Spanish 
banking sector had to be rescued” as a way of avoiding the rescue of the whole country. 
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According to the expert, CaixaBank was not problematic, but many other “savings banks had 
problems during the crisis, because they were influenced by politicians and were not so 
professional”.  
Regarding the use of CriteriaCaixa (the Group’s unlisted holding company) as an 
intermediary holder of the assets of the foundation (i.e. industrial and financial investments 
amounting up to €20 Billion), versus holding them directly like it happens in the remaining 
cases in Spain and Portugal, the justification given bares the great size of the assets that the 
foundation holds and the fact that “CriteriaCaixa has specialized staff in risk management, as 
well as, people representing the foundation´s interests and individual experts.” Thus, “it is 
convenient that these holdings are under CriteriaCaixa, because as a big business, it is very 
important to be a solid group. So, La Caixa Foundation controls what CriteriaCaixa is doing, 
but runs directly all the welfare projects.” 
Another puzzling aspect had to do with the stake of CaixaBank held by the foundation 
(40%), to which the respondent walked us through the bank’s history. Succinctly, when 
CaixaBank, the group’s company responsible for all financial activity was, created in 2011, it 
was also listed on the market for trade. At some point, the foundation had 60%-70% of 
CaixaBank, yet, when the exchange rates got too low, the ECB9 and the Bank of Spain found 
necessary to impose a limit to foundation-ownership of 40%. This was a precautionary measure 
to protect the rest of the “la Caixa” investments, as if there is a new banking crisis, the 
foundation will only be responsible for the 40% stock they have in their holdings, versus having 
to save the whole bank and risking the remaining assets, in case they hold more than that. On 
the other hand, the foundation-ownership is kept at the limit imposed since “the foundation is 
pretty comfortable with 40% of CaixaBank, as half of their investments are in banking (mainly 
in Caixa Bank, but also Bank of East Asia and in Inbursa in Mexico) and the other half in the 
                                                             
9 ECB - European Central Bank 
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industry, services and real estate portfolio.  The future prospects are that they will keep the 
holding of CaixaBank forever, not because it is required in the charter, but because “the 
foundation has a very long history with CaixaBank and a name to respect”, so in other words, 
“la Caixa” Foundation is seen as long-term shareholder of CaixaBank.Moreover, when asked 
about the influence of the foundation in the management of CaixaBank and in the other assets, 
he responded that, nowadays10, the aim is “not to control every company, but to control several 
strategic and also historical investments where the “la Caixa” is relevant. The goal is to be 
seated with one, two or more members at the board of the company, to participate in the 
decision-making.” In small companies that can mean owning a big share or even totally but is 
more difficult to do so in very large multinational companies, where 20% can sometimes 
guarantee the presence in the vote. Nevertheless, the foundation has also several minor holdings 
that behave like an investment fund. 
Regarding his opinion on advantages of foundation-ownership, he highlighted the 
foundation’s investment behaviour which is similar throughout most foundations, i.e. 
foundations “are very conservative” when doing investments, they “have medium-long term 
vision”, and “do not want to get a lot of profit quickly”, but instead “stable investments that 
pay out investments every year, in order to be able to cover foundation’s welfare projects’ 
costs”. In practice, that “does not mean only invest in big and very profitable corporates”, but 
instead, “la Caixa”, through CriteriaCaixa, manages risk, controls and invests in different 
geographic markets and economy sectors, as well as, it invests in cyclical and non-cyclical 
companies, so that all investments complement each other.  
The expert demonstrated, however, short knowledge about industrial foundations existing in 
Spain (apart from the banking foundations). Nonetheless, he recognized some after hearing 
                                                             
10 The responded did a comparison with the with the vision "la Caixa" had 10-15 years ago, when it preferred to 
"only invest in business that (they) understand and that (they) control. So, (they) only wanted to be in few 
companies where (they) can be dominant in the vote or/and have an agreement with other shareholders." 
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about the other cases analysed in this study, and further explained its establishment through 
founder’s donations of assets. By the end of the conversation, the respondent clarified the “la 
Caixa”’s long-term mission regarding the size of the foundation’s assets, explicitly, “in one 
century, the goal is to have the equivalent or more than the €20 Billion in assets and a steady, 
yet slow, growth of the €500 Million foundation’s budget to invest in its medium- to long-term 
welfare projects.”  
5. Discussion 
5.1 Theoretical and practical implications:  
The outline of the present thesis is motivated by two research questions; 1) how is the 
concept of Industrial Foundation understood in the Southern Europe, particularly in Portugal 
and Spain, and 2) how does it differentiate from other European countries. 
 Thus, one first insight is that the concept of Industrial Foundation does apply, to some extent, 
in these countries, yet, it is not recognized by this nomenclature, but instead, by corporate 
foundation or enterprise foundation (“Fundação de empresa” or “Fundação corporativa” in 
Portugal, or “Fundación-empresa” in Spain), terminology which Steen Thomsen (2017) 
associates with a foundation established to prosecute the CSR11 purposes of a company. This 
theory was also confirmed by one of the experts interviewed from the Portuguese foundations, 
to which he added that one of the motives was also marketing, or in other words, brand 
promotion. To what comes to business ownership by foundations, there is no legal barrier that 
prevents foundations to develop or hold business companies, it is in fact, “natural”, according 
to one of the interviewees, that foundations develop or invest in several business companies, 
in order to generate dividends that pay for the philanthropic activities developed by them. 
Nonetheless, the level to which industrial foundations, or foundations with business-
ownership, is developed in Portugal and Spain, is relatively small, with greater insignificance 
                                                             
11 CSR – Corporate Social Responsibility 
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in Portugal, when compared to other European countries (Couto, 2018). One reason appointed 
by one of the experts interviewed, for the Portuguese context, has to do with the nationalization 
process that happened in 1975 and which extinguished the majority of the capitalists and large 
companies existing at the time. On the Spanish situation this movement did not take place, 
which explains the existence of larger, yet still few, industrial foundations. As a matter of fact, 
they have been emerging in more recent times, as foundation ownership has been perceived as 
advantageous and a successful model of ownership. One example is Grupo Siro Foundation 
(F9), which aims for perpetuity of its business and that was inspired by the “successful 
precedent model of Mapfre” Foundation (F6) (ESADE, 2017) to establish one too, and donate 
some ownership. Specifically, in the latter case (F6), the foundation, established in 1976, only 
became owner of the majority of the voting rights in 2006, when Mapfre executives decided 
this transition, because “first, it sounds very nice and social the idea of Foundation (versus 
private investors ownership) and, second, by maintaining control of the company within the 
Foundation, it will protect it from financial sharks that may try to buy it. In other words, when 
someone wants to buy the company, the decision makers will be the managers, who control it 
through the Foundation, and not the shareholders.” (Alvaréz-Moro, 2006). Thus, this goes in 
line with previous literature that supports foundation-ownership contributes to long-term 
governance and long-termism of the business (Børsting et al., 2014a).  
Moreover, the samples in this study confirm that, first, industrial foundations can be found 
across all different industries, as Kuhn and Thomsen also concluded in a study in 2015, second, 
industrial foundations will have more success with already large and consolidated enterprises 
(Børsting et al., 2014a), this is clear in F6-C6, F8-C8 and F9-C9 cases of the Spanish sample. 
An additional proof on the latter conclusion is the F4-C4 case, where the on-going bad financial 
performance and small size of the bank (C4) are putting at risk foundation-ownership in the 
near future. Notwithstanding, the experts’ insights collected through this research reveal that, 
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despite that they wish to keep their stakes in C5 and C7 today, as a matter of respect for its 
history, nothing forbids them of selling it in the future, if they believe the money will be better 
invested somewhere else, therefore, foundation is not, necessarily, as a “commitment 
mechanism” that guarantees the existence of the business in perpetuity as Scheling (1960) 
proposed. Their paramount objective is to manage the assets in order to guarantee return to pay 
the projects. As a matter of fact, the largest foundation in Portugal (F1) and the best example 
of industrial ownership in the country, sold recently its company (C1) bequeathed by the 
founder, after previewing its decline in the future. 
Additionally, the size of ownership held by the foundations also depicts different insights in 
both countries. In Portugal, the stakes of ownership are higher but companies are small-medium 
enterprises, and in the case of minority ownership (F5-C5) the expert affirms it not to be an 
example of industrial foundation, but only a financial asset donated by the founder. On the 
other side of the border, in Spain, the stakes are necessarily smaller but with large and 
consolidated companies, and influence on management seems to have greater impact, as 
foundations managed to have some seats in the board and participate in the decision-making.  
Regarding the foundation behaviour as an investor, and which is in consonance with the 
literature, that foundations managed their assets in a conservative way, by investing in risk-
free (or reduced risk) projects, giving preference to companies that provide constant and stable 
dividends and investing in diversified industries and locations to avoid idiosyncratic risk. 
Lastly, this study also contributes with interesting insights about the enablers for emergence 
of foundation-ownership, theory suggests that tax-saving is one of the explanations, and in fact 
both in Portugal and Spain, companies owned by foundations are exempt from paying 
corporate taxes, yet tax incentives are not big enough to be one of the main motivations to 
foundation creation or company-ownership by foundations in the Iberian countries.  
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Overall, this thesis might be purposeful to policymakers, corporates and foundations aiming 
at finding a sustainable and rational solution to promote long-term governance.  
5.3 Limitations and Directions for future research: 
This study involves a number of limitations that shall be taken into consideration. First, 
given constraints in time, proper access to data and limited size of the working project, it is not 
possible to guarantee the existence of more cases of foundation-ownership, in Portugal and 
Spain, of interest for the research, as well as a more complete investigation of each of the cases. 
On the other hand, the small size of the sample does not allow generalization of the conclusions 
inferred.  
Hence, future research should, then, exploit more substantially these cases by including, for 
instance, an overview of the financial performance of the foundation-owned companies, a 
deeper investigation of the legal structure of each country or an analysis of the governance 
behaviour of the foundation-owned companies. Investing more resources into finding more 
cases of foundation-owned companies is also recommended. Finally, to better close the 
addressed gap in the literature, more countries in the South of Europe should be scrutinized, as 
foundation ownership seems to be a reasonable solution to guarantee companies’ long-term 
stability. The author hopes the current project inspires others to contribute to this discussion, 
as both qualitative and quantitative studies are important and necessary to enhance the 
understanding of this concept.  
6. Conclusion 
The current thesis contributes to the literature by offering here a first effort to analyse 
qualitatively the role of foundation-ownership in the Iberian countries. The study finds that, 
besides that there exist no legal constraints, this concept is, yet, very unexplored in both 
countries. On one hand in Spain, it starts to exist some recognition of the benefits of this 
structure for the long-term performance and some large companies are modifying their 
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organization towards this concept, nevertheless, insignificant tax incentives and overall 
unfamiliarity with the concept may justify that there are not many important examples of 
industrial foundations. In Portugal, on the other hand, there are several examples of historical 
industrial “family-foundations”, where recognized capitalists in the past have donated their 
assets to a foundation, with the goal of foundations looking after them and continue the social 
projects of the founders, however, the sizes of the assets are considerably small and the drastic 
extinction of influential capitalists in the previous century did not allow, yet, for great capital 
accumulation and consequent foundation establishment. Furthermore, in conformity with 
Spain there is little knowledge about the model of industrial foundations. One last rationale has 
to do with cultural context of both countries, they both score worse than Nordic countries on 
governance and corruption indicators (Kaufmann, Et al., 2010) which may create reluctance to 
this model and lack of trust that companies’ returns will be redistributed to society through 
foundations’ philanthropic activities.  
Overall, there is space and legal conditions for this concept to proliferate in both countries. 
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Table 1 "Thomsen lens" variables 
“Thomsen lens”’ variables to filter “Industrial Foundations” in Portugal and Spain 
T1. Controlling ownership - A controlling ownership stake in a business company: Full (100%) or 
controlling influence (>50%) of the voting rights. 
T2. Business Company - Control over a company that sells goods and services to the public on a 
commercial basis (i.e. in a competitive market). No concern between commercial versus charitable 
activity, yet the commercial activity must be significant in terms of magnitude of sales and where the 
primary goal is profitability. (For example, income generated from museum tickets, small food 
establishments, etc. is taken in consideration). 
T3. Creation by Donation - The industrial foundation is created through an irreversible donation, 
by the company’s founder (or descendants), of its ownership rights in the company. These 
contemplate the initial endowment of the foundation. 
T4. Non-selfish Goal - Industrial Foundations usually engage in both business and charitable 
purposes. For instance, the part of the dividend income generated by the business is earmarked to a 











































Table 5 Consolidated data of each individual of Portuguese and Spanish samples 
 
Table 6 Interview with Jorge Quintas from Amélia de Mello Foundation (F5) 
Foundation: Fundação 
Amélia de Mello                                
 Company: Grupo CUF 
Interviewee: Jorge Quintas Position(s): General secretary of Fundação Amélia de Mello 
Contact level: Phone call Date: December 12, 2019 
Note: The following interview transcript includes the main structural questions and insightful answers, thus, initial 
presentation of the project, related talk and final acknowledgments are not comprised. Part of the conversational text may 
have suffered minor alterations in the interconnection of ideas in order to facilitate the flow of reading. The interview 
was done in Portuguese and it was translated for the purpose and format of the current thesis. Lastly, as mentioned in the  
methodology, the interview was realised in a semi-structured way allowing a more focused, open and fluid conversation.  
Q1: Have you ever about the concept of Industrial Foundations? 
A1: No. In the categories of foundations I only know two, which are the corporative/business foundations 
and the family foundations, that is the distinction I make. Yet, there may be more, for instance, there is a 
sub-type, the territorial foundations, which have special criteria for the territory where they intervene, one 
example, is the Gulbenkian Foundation, which is a family foundation with territorial intervention criteria, 
too. That is, it intervenes at the national level (Portugal), but it also develops projects only in Armenia, 
where the foundation's founder is originated from. In his legacy, he created the foundation where he said 
the foundation does this and that, but also imposed the foundation to develop something specific in the 
territory where he was born, Armenia. In addition, the Gulbenkian Foundation, until very recently owned 
a company, named Partex, a company that operates in the field of oil products.  
Overall, in Portugal, as far as I know, foundations that own businesses, we have, for example, two more: 
the foundation of Berardo, which owns the Bacalhôa Wines, and the Eugénio de Almeida Foundation that 
owns Cartuxa and Pêra Manca wines. Then, it is natural that there are more foundations ownings 
businesses, for example, in the area of education, there is a foundation that is CEBI that owns a large 
college in Alverca, which even has secondary education, inclusive. Moreover, there are, nowadays, many 
foundations that have a different business essence, which are the Foundations of Universities, some 
universities are currently migrating to the foundation model, Universidade Nova de Lisboa as well as the 
University of Lisbon are two of these cases. The Catholic University has a foundation, as well, but is a 
different case, since it is a catholic university, it depends on the Cardinal Patriarch of Lisbon, so in that 
sense, let's say the owner is the Patriarchate of Lisbon. In the world, there are many, however, in the United 
States, in Germany, in Belgium there are many foundations that are business owners, the Henkel 
Foundation, for example, the Prosegur Foundation, the Ramón Areces Foundation which is the owner of 
El Corte Ingles, with a great participation, the La Caixa Foundation which has 40% of La Caixa bank, 
among others. 
Q2: What is the size of the business that is you perceive, in order to be consider it to be an Industrial 
Foundation? 
A2: It is important to contextualize each case and perceive then its size at a scale. For example, in the case 
of CEBI Foundation, the foundation and its college are very large in Alverca, they have a large dimension 
given the specific context of the region in which it operates. 
Q3: What are the tax incentives for foundations that own businesses? 
A3: Foundations with public utility are exempt from Corporate income tax (IRC) that is, in fact, a relevant 
issue matter of study. 
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Q4: In Portugal, do you think this is one of the reasons why some companies are owned by 
foundations? 
A4: As far as I know, I don't believe that is the optic, I believe that is what motivate foundations to own 
businesses. On the other hand, foundations, in general, are not created to be business owners, because 
business is a capitalist entrepreneurial market activity, so a foundation is not in the position to own a 
business. Its main objective is philanthropy, social activity. 
Q5: Regarding the Amélia de Mello Foundation, which owns 4.15% of the CUF Group, can you 
explain how that influences management of the hospitals and clinics? 
A5: Yes, the foundation owns 4.15% of the Group, but with such small stake we don't control or influence 
the management, at all. 
Q6: What are prospects of the evolution of this ownership? 
A6: At the moment, we wish to maintain it and not to increase the stake. Tomorrow we may decide to sell 
the stake for some reason, yet, today we want to keep it, we are not thinking to sell. 
Q7: Previously, you have identified 2 or 3 types of foundations, can you explain, better the definitions? 
A7: First, there are the corporate foundations (e.g.: BCP Foundation, EDP Foundation, Altice 
Foundation…), i.e. foundations that are associated with a brand and therefore, that is the marketing motive 
associated. The “la Caixa” Foundation is marketing, they run mega advertising campaigns, because it 
gives people the idea that more than the la Caixa bank, it is also a bank that gives money to social  
institutions, gives scholarships, is solidary. Another case is the BCP, it not only makes money from 
customers but also gives money to the National Museum of Ancient Art as well to an orchestra. Family 
foundations, on the other side, have no connection with the business. 
Q9: Do you consider the Amélia de Mello Foundation a family foundation and how was it created? 
A9:  Yes, it has nothing to do with a corporate/business, its name is not a brand. Dom Manuel de Mello, 
when he created the foundation, offered the foundation his personal heritage with varied meanings. 
Nowadays, there is no company called Mello. The CUF Group is not the Mello brand, not the hospital 
Mello, not the Mello bank, not the Mello insurance company. Fula oil is not Mello oil. We are, clearly, a 
family foundation, such as the Ilidio Pinho Foundation or the Belmiro de Azevedo Foundation, that is, 
these are linked to the family, have a family project. Attention, the Belmiro de Azevedo Foundation owns 
a big school in Porto. 
Q10: Do you perceive the term business foundation ("fundação empresarial") as the same corporate 
foundation ("fundação corporativa")? 
A10: Yes, for me they mean the same. 
Q11: How do you describe the Amélia de Mello Foundation behavior as an investor? 
A11: We have shares in BCP, CUF Group, we invest in New York Stock Exchange, in the fund we manage 
the portfolio, it is very diversified. 
Q12: Which are the foundation's key areas of action where dividends are allocated? 
A12: We statutorily have two areas of intervention, which are education and social assistance, two mandatory 
areas. We can only apply our social investment funds to projects in these areas. 
Q13: Do you think that the concept of industrial foundation applies in Portugal? 
A13: Yes, it applies but to little extent. Gulbenkian is an exemplary case of it, the Berardo Foundation has a 
very clear evidence as well, the FEA, the Oriente Foundation, the CEBI Foundation among others. The 
Fundação Oriente, for instance, seeks, through investment in the Bank, returns to have dividends to finance 
its activity. There are several examples of industrial foundations.                                                                           The 
EDP foundation, on the other hand, is a foundation that lives with donations from EDP. It is not one of 
the owners of EDP, the business they own just a museum, whose activity is not considered significant or 
relevant to the concept of industrial foundation. 
Thus, within corporate foundations, the foundations that hold company shares may, therefore, be 
considered industrial foundations, and there are corporate foundations that are only to carry out their social 
activities with or without marketing intent. 
Q14: Overall, what do you resonate for the reduced existence of industrial foundations in Portugal? 
And, what do you think about Spain? 
A14: Unfortunately, in Portugal there aren't many big and known industrial foundations, because there was a 
process of nationalizations that destroyed the corporate economy. What happens with nationalizations is 
that it destroys the corporate entrepreneurial structure. When this happened, capitalists stopped existing in 
Portugal, the state appropriated the Portuguese business sector. It was in 1975, after the April 25 Carnation 
Revolution, in 1974, when all the big companies were nationalized and the state became the only owner. 
Meanwhile, in Spain, the capitalists continued to exist, no one touched them.                                                                                                
So with nationalizations, the entrepreneurial structure was completely destroyed and never recovered until 
today. 
The "old money" is over, only the Mellos are left. When we refer to "old money", we talk about Burnays, 
Borges, Espírito Santo, which all ended. Of the capitalists that exist today, most are considered “new 
money”: Amorim, Belmiro de Azevedo, Soares dos Santos, who emerged after the nationalization era 
and/or gained a much larger scale after that time (e.g.: Amorim that already existed before 1975 with an 
insignificant size). 
Q15: Nowadays, do you believe that exist the necessary conditions for this type of foundation structure 
to develop? Is there any kind of incentive? 
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A15: Yes, if the economy improves, if companies are able to grow, it is natural that it will happen. 
For example, the Altice Foundation will have more capacity, as well as, the “la Caixa” Foundation , the 
Mota-Engil Foundation, etc. So, this structure will develop but wealth creation is necessary, economic 
development is necessary, so that wealth can be distributed through the foundations.  
Therefore, it is necessary to go to the root of the problem to understand why there are no large foundations 
in Portugal. That is because there is no real business sector in Portugal, it is very small and incipient, and 
part of it goes back to April 25th.  
If we do not have a private economy as there will be philanthropy, foundations and aid to society, it is 
impossible. 
 
Table 7 Interview with Rafael Chueca from "la Caixa" Foundation (F7) 
 
Foundation:  "la Caixa" Foundation                                    
 Company:CaixaBank 
Interviewee:Rafael Chueca 
Position(s): Corporate Director and Member of the Executive Committee at ”la 
Caixa” Foundation  
Contact level: Videoconference Date:December 2, 2019 
Note: The following interview transcript includes the main structural questions and insightful answers, thus, initial 
presentation of the project, related talk and final acknowledgments are not comprised. Part of the conversational text 
may have suffered minor alterations in the interconnection of ideas in order to facilitate the flow of reading. Lastly, as 
mentioned in the methodology, the interview was realised in a semi-structured way allowing a more focused, open and 
fluid conversation.  
Q1: Have you ever about the concept of Industrial Foundations? 
A1: I believe yes, in a meeting at Vieira de Almeida Lawyers, with other foundations which I believe were 
Industrial Foundations from Portugal, they were all foundations coming from corporations. 
Q2: By walking us through the history of "la Caixa", can you further explain the merge of several 
savings banks (known as Cajas) that happened along the time, which resulted in the great "la Caixa" 
business group as we know it today? 
A2: La Caixa is the result of the merge of more than 70 small and greater saving banks. These banks, known 
as Cajas, were created very locally (since 1904), in almost every village in Spain. They were small because 
people living in those villages put their savings together to guarantee some kind of pension, before the 
beginning of social security's pension plans. Altogether, their money was invested in the village, enabling to 
help other people in the same community and contributing, in the end, to the social-economic development 
of these local communities. La Caixa was created in Barcelona and was the biggest of all these banks. For 
one century many merges of several savings banks took place, up until 1990, when there were several big 
savings banks, and as la Caixa was the largest, other savings banks merge with it creating the great "la Caixa" 
savings banks group.  
Q3: What motivated the creation, in 2011, of Caixa Bank, which became responsible of all financial 
activity of the within la Caixa Group? Also, later, in 2014, what resonates the law that required all 
savings banks, including la Caixa, to become banking foundations? 
A3: At the time, savings banks, namely la Caixa, were doing on their own the three things: financial activity, 
industrial activity (i.e. the investments made in several industrial sectors) and welfare projects (helping the 
community). In the late times (2011), la Caixa Group created Caixa Bank to be the only responsible for 
financial activities, while, CriteriaCaixa (the group’s unlisted holding company) was responsible for the 
management of the Industrial investments - all under the umbrella of LaCaixa Savings Bank. In this moment 
(2013), there is a new law in Spain, because Spain had to receive a banking rescue during the crisis. It was 
different from Portugal and Greece, that received a rescue as a country. In Spain only the banking sector was 
rescued, and by putting money in the banks, they avoided to have a rescue as a country. So, one of the 
conditions that the European Union and Troika imposed in Spain was to transform Savings Banks into 
foundations, in order to impose some rules on the composition of the governing boards. La Caixa, itself, had 
no problems, but other savings banks were problematic during the crisis, as they were influenced by 
politicians and were not so professionals. It is a very complex measure, but this is what they thought: no 
more savings banks in Spain, they have to transform into foundations, and if these Savings Banks have a 
relevant part of commercial banks they have to be a Banking Foundation and, consequently, will be 
controlled by the Ministry of Economy and Bank of Spain. There were other Savings Bank that had lost the 
bank they hold, because the bank was rescued, and these have transformed into common foundations.  
Q4: All shareholdings of the “la Caixa” Foundation are owned by CriteriaCaixa, including CaixaBank, 
since 2014. What motivated the transfer to this equity instrumental company, versus keeping these 
holdings directly in the hands of the foundation? 
A4: CriteriaBank was not created in 2014, it already assisted. It was like a reorganization of the Group. The 
La Caixa Banking Foundation is currently the indirect owner of all the assets, which previously belonged to 
La Caixa Savings Banks, so around €20 Billion invested in banking and other industries. We decided to put 
all these assets into CriteriaCaixa holding, because it has specialized staff in risk management, as well as, 
people representing the foundation interests and individual experts. It is convenient that these holdings are 
under CriteriaCaixa, because as a big business, it is for us very important to be a solid group. Hence, LaCaixa 
Foundation controls what CriteriaCaixa is doing while running directly all the welfare projects. It could be 
different, but bearing the size of the foundation, these are separated. 




A5:  When CaixaBank was created (2011), they "opened" it in the stock market for individual or institutional 
investments. So there was a time that the foundation had 60%-70% Caixa Bank, and the rest was in the stock 
market. Yet, there was a point in which the exchange rates got too low, and ECB and Bank of Spain decided 
it was necessary to impose a limit on the foundation-ownership of the bank to 40%. This is a precautionary 
measure to protect the rest of the “la Caixa” investments, as if there is a new banking crisis, the foundation 
will only be responsible for the 40% stock they have in their holdings, versus having to save the bank as a 
whole, risking the remaining assets, in case they hold more than that. By going down to 40%, they can 
separate, and La Caixa Foundation and CriteriaCaixa become one thing and the CaixaBank is another think, 
being the foundation only responsible for the 40% stock they have in their hands. 
Q6: Why does la Caixa Foundation keep these 40% and not less? 
A6: The foundation is pretty comfortable with 40% of CaixaBank, as half of their investments are in banking 
(mainly in Caixa Bank, but also Bank of East Asia and in Inbursa in Mexico) and the other half in industry, 
services and real estate portfolio.    
Q7: What are the future prospects of foundation ownership regarding CaixaBank and remaining 
assets? 
A7:  In the future, the foundation can sell or maintain the share, depending on the markets and the foundation's 
strategy, but not buy more shares as they are restricted by the law. There is, however, a minor possibility 
that the foundation decides that the money will be better out of CaixaBank and invested in other assets, since 
“the foundation has a very long history with CaixaBank and a name to respect”, so in other words, “la Caixa” 
Foundation is seen as long-term shareholder of CaixaBank. The mission is to keep the investment in 
CaixaBank and remaining assets forever, because is what is paying the welfare projects.  
Q8: What is the level of influence la Caixa Foundation has in the management of CaixaBank and all its 
assets?  
A8:  It depends, we are diversifying now. La Caixa used to say, 10-15 years ago, that we would only invest in 
business that we understand and that we control. With those two conditions, we only wanted to be in few 
companies, where we can be dominant, be in the vote or/and have an agreement with other shareholders. In 
the last two years, however, we have decided that we can be in some companies with these same concepts, 
but we can manage the risk of some companies through an investment fund, as a financial activity not as an 
industrial activity. For instance, in some we have a lot of control, like at CaixaBank we have 40% of shares 
and we have 40% of the vote, with a lot of different shareholders, in Naturgy we are very relevant, same as 
in Saba. However, there are other companies that, maybe, we are now with 5% of the company, and in a 
year, we will be in 10%, or in 0% if we think we have to buy other assets instead. So, nowadays, our goal is 
not to control every company where we buy assets, but in several strategic and also historical investments 
where the “la Caixa” is relevant, goal is to be seated with one, two or more members at the board of the 
company, to participate in the decision-making, while the rest is managed like an investment fund.  
Q9: What do you define as controlling a company? Is it necessarily holding majority of the shares 
(>50%)? 
A9:  In small companies that can mean owning a big share or even totally but is more difficult to do so in very 
large multinational companies, where 20% can sometimes guarantee the presence in the vote.  
Q10: What are the advantages you see in foundation ownership? Do you see foundation as long-term 
shareholder? 
A10: We are a foundation, so I believe being in a foundation is good. For a company, maybe the difference is 
that foundations, almost every foundation, has a medium- to long-term vision. We are not trying to get a lot 
of profit quickly, we prefer stable investments that give us dividends to pay our welfare projects, constant 
dividends. So, we don’t like adventures, not us and not the rest of foundations, because the activity of 
investments is what allow every foundation to run their social activity. So we are not risky, we don’t want a 
big profit in one year and no profit the next year. We are very conservative and, maybe, for many companies 
that are not very risky and are not trying to grow quickly, they would like shareholders like us.  
So, what we believe we can give to CaixaBank, Naturgy, etc., is that we have a big part of our investments 
stable and conservative. In the other side, for companies that want to grow a lot and fast, we are not very 
good shareholders because we want dividends every year.  
For example, Apple spent more than 10/15 years to deliver dividends, because everybody that was putting 
money there wanted the company to grow a lot. They were, in fact, getting a lot of money, because the value 
of the stocks was growing and growing a lot. Nevertheless, they were not paying dividends. We dont like 
these companies, we would have not been a good investor for Apple when it was being created 15 years ago. 
Q11: Within the Iberian or Spanish context do you think that foundation ownership is a viable structure’ 
Are there any barriers? Do you think it fits our mindset? 
A11:  I don’t so many cases of foundations owning companies, apart from the savings banks, of which we are 
the main one. Every savings bank that survived the crisis was transformed in a banking foundation, keeping 
their bank's ownership. 
Q12: (Bearing the interviewee’s unfamiliarity with other industrial foundations existing in Spain and in 
Portugal, it was made a brief description about the other examples included in the sample used.)  
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A12: As much as I know, several of these cases are the result of donation of heritage of the founder of the 
company: Ramón Areces, for instance, was the founder El Corte Inglés and he decided to create a foundation 
to run his stocks and made some welfare projects close to his death. The foundation is, per se, the 
transformation of part of the ownership that Ramón Areces had. It is the same with Grupo Siro and I'm not 
sure about Mapfre and ONCE. ONCE is, in fact, the institution that has been working with blind people in 
Spain for many years and has got a lot of money from the lottery they sell. Then, they put the money into 
the foundation, that made investments in several industries in order to create employment for disabled 
people, resulting, in the end, in the creation of the Ilunion business group.                                                               
Overall, the thing is: to be a foundation owning a company you need the money, so it has to be either heritage 
or someone that is getting a lot of capital from other sources. So, maybe, millionaires can create foundations. 
In case they are expecting to die in 10-15 years and don't want their sons and daughters to inherit their assets 
or, alternatively, have no descendants, decide that their fortune should go to a foundation. On the other hand, 
a different kind of heritage are savings banks, because, necessarily, these have to die and create foundations. 
Perhaps, in Northern Europe it is more common to have industrial foundations due to history and tradition. 
Q13: One potential reason can tax-savings benefits. Do you think that is the case? 
A13: Here there is almost no advantage. I don’t believe there is no big incentive. Normally, in Spain, 
foundations are created for other reasons than tax savings, I don't know about Portugal. 
Q14: Coming back to the behaviour of La Caixa Foundation as an investor, as mentioned, you don't want 
fast profits, you prefer sustainable profits that guarantees the foundation stable dividends. Does that 
mean you could prefer bigger and more consolidated companies? 
A14: I would say that, 5 years ago, we wanted big companies, but now, it is different. In Criteria we have a lot 
of risk management, we control European markets, American markets, Asian markets…, we control the 
primary sector, secondary sector..., and with the money we have to invest, risk of some investments must be 
covered by investing in assets that do not suffer from the same risk at the same time. So, we are diversifying 
a lot more now than years ago. Like I told you, to have the control of the company is not a condition as it 
was 10 years ago. Thus, we can own part of a company in Japan that we think it complements our investments 
in other areas, not having necessarily to control it. So, if this market goes down, we have other companies 
to compensate. That is why, for instance, we have 17.5% of Bank of East Asia and 9.1% of Inbursa in 
Mexico, because they are in different areas. If there is a big crisis, everything is going wrong, but we are 
trying to have investments in what we call anti-cycle companies (i.e. when everything is going good, these 
companies are not going as good, but when everything goes bad they survive, a good example are insurance 
companies).                                                                                                                            Overall, what is 
important for us is that in one century we want to have the equivalent of our €20 Billion we have in our 
assets and a steady, yet slow, growth of the €500 Million foundation’s budget to invest in our medium- to 
long-term welfare projects. Therefore, regardless of the great size of our assets compared with the size of 
the budget, we want to balance it carefully, and not spent a big amount every year, as we want our assets to 
grow and not to lose value. 
I give you an example to clarify: Melinda and Bill Gates foundation did the opposite. Not every foundation 
works like us. They are much richer and bigger than us but they’ve decided to spent all the money while 
they are alive. It is the biggest foundation in world in assets and budget, but they do not mind that there will 
be no money after their death, because they want to help while they are still alive. For us is completely 
different: we want to be as rich as we are now in one century time. La Caixa's money is not our money, it is 
the money of one century of history, so we want to keep it like this forever. This is how it is; some 
foundations want to be like us and others want to be like the case of Bill and Melinda Gates foundation.  
Q15: La Caixa Foundation was mentioned as the Spanish quite powerhouse, because despite you being 
the third largest foundation in the world and controlling assets in several industries in Spain, you are 
not so known outside of Spain. Why do you think that happens? 
A15: We would like to be more known and we are very big, yet, people even believe that we are more influential 
than we actually are. That is because it is true, when you have investments in banking, in gas, in 
communications, in satellites, in everything, you are deciding a lot of things that affect the population. We 
are the 3rd biggest foundation in the world (depending on the year and stock markets), still we are within 
the top 5 main foundations in budget and in assets, so, to have such big foundation in Spain, which is not a 
country like USA, it is important. And we are spending a lot of money in Spain mostly, and now in Portugal, 
€500 M for a foundation is a lot. We would like to be more recognized, and we are working for that, 
nevertheless, what we are not doing is to change our activities just to be recognized. We have spent, for 
instance, €60 M in child poverty in Spain, his is a lot of money in Spain. We are helping thousands of 
families, but it is very difficult to be known because of that, as these activities are not exhibitions or concerts. 
Today, at this hour, we have people working with the families in every big city, trying to help them. If we 
wanted just to be recognized, we would spend this money in exhibitions and other things.  
However, once we have done these things we would like to be more recognized and, of course, we would 
like newspapers saying La Caixa Foundation is helping everyone in Spain and Portugal, but is not realistic 
yet. 
To conclude, we don't want to be a quite power, we want to be loud, but for the moment we are what we are. 
Q16: Finalising, do you see la Caixa Foundation as an Industrial Foundation? 
A16: Yes, I think we are. By definition we are a banking foundation established by law, we don't decide our 
name. 
But if we had to define us, we would be an industrial foundation, because 50% of our investment is in 
banking and 50% in other industrial assets, so I believe are an industrial foundation 
 
